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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY H. FORRER, 
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STUART REED, RUSSELL REED, DONALD 
REED, FRANKLIN REED, MARGARET REED 
CORDIE MAE REED and LAWANNA KAY 
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Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs 
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Case No. 14572 
APPELLANTS f BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff brought an action in the lower court to 
determine the validity of a mortgage in favor of the defendants 
and to quiet title in and to the following described real property 
in Uintah County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN 
Section 35: The East half of the Southeast quarter of the 
Northwest quarter; the West half of the South-
west quarter of the Northeast quarter; 
(hereinafter referred to as subject property). 
The defendants initially answered by asserting the validity 
of their mortgage and thereafter counterclaimed in the alter-
native for the foreclosure of their mortgage, or for the court 
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to determine that they were the rightful owners of said property. 
The defendants also cross-claimed against other persons who were 
made parties to the action. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court decreed that the plaintiff was the legal 
owner of the subject property, but that the property was subject 
to a valid mortgage in favor of the defendants in the amount of 
$15,750.00. Defendants were granted a judgment against Ezilda 
Van Hendricks and Charles Hendricks, counter-defendants, for 
$15,750.00, plus $25.60 in court costs and interest at the rate 
of eight (8%) percent per annum from the date of entry of judg-
ment until paid, together with a decree of foreclosure of the 
defendants1 mortgage, thereby selling the subject property to 
satisfy the indebtedness of the Hendricks to the defendants. The 
court also entered the default of the defendants, Stuart Reed, 
Russell Reed, and Donald Reed, who did not appear in the matter, 
to answer plaintiff's complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff, Henry Forrer, and counter-defendants, Robert 
Sather, Roger Roberson and Ethel LaVerna Roberson, desire this 
court to reverse the decision of the trial court, granting the 
defendants a decree of foreclosure against the subject property, 
and to decree that by operation of law, the subject property is 
free and clear of the mortgage to the defendants in the sum of 
$15,750.00. 
- 3 -
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION of the pairties, which stipulation 
is pages 95 through 100 of the transcript, contains a concise 
statement of all the relevant facts as they existed prior to the 
submission of the matter to the court. This court is faced with 
the determination of whether the lower court made the correct 
application of the law to the stipulated! facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS1 MORTGAGE ON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION 
WAS NEVER A VALID LIEN. 
While the pretrial order asserts thkt the mortgage is a 
valid lien, the court, nevertheless, has 
effects of the mortgage instrument that 
settled law that a person cannot give a 
to consider the legal 
tLs in question. It is 
valid mortgage to pro-
perty that is not legally his. By examining the exhibit entitled, 
"Deed to Restricted Indian Land", it is 
deed is from Lily Reed Wash and Chalmers] 
question, to the "United States of Ameri 
Reed Hendricks, an allotted Uintah Ute." 
deed was not recorded in the records of Uintah County, and there-
fore, any alleged interest of Ezilda Reed Hendricks could not be 
of record. Said restricted deed was given on the 4th of January, 
^1954. The patent in and to the property in question was not 
issued by the United States Government until October, 1959, which 
patent was not recorded until October 18 
Ezilda Van Hendricks and Charles A. Hendjricks issued a mortgage 
fto be noted that said 
Wash for the land in 
ba in Trust for Ezilda 
The fact is, that said 
, 1966. Thus, when 
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to the defendants, namely, on December 19, 19 56, they had nothing 
to mortgage. There was no chain of title in and to the property 
in question in the records of Uintah County in the name of either 
Charles A. Hendricks or Ezilda Van Hendricks and in fact, the 
only evidence of title in either of them was an unrecorded deed 
to restricted Indian land wherein the United States of America 
held title to said property as Trustee for Ezilda Reed Hendricks. 
Apparently, on December 19, 1956, Ezilda Reed Hendricks was a 
ward of the United States Government as were all other enrolled 
members of the Ute Tribe. But in any event, the fact is, there 
was no property in the name of Ezilda Hendricks, nor did she have 
legal title to this property, and therefore, she could not 
mortgage the same to her children, the defendants. It would thus 
reasonably appear that the recording of the mortgage from Ezilda 
Van Hendricks and Charles Hendricks to the defendants herein 
should be considered the same as a "stray" deed or mortgage. 
Title 57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, requires the 
recording of instruments in order to impart notice. Since in 
December, 1957, there was no recorded chain of title of the 
property from the patentee or the United States Government to 
Ezilda Van Hendricks, it would be reasonable for the ordinary and 
prudent person to assume that there was no title in fact, in 
Ezilda Van Hendricks, and that said mortgage was but a "stray" 
mortgage. This conclusion seems even the more reasonable since 
there was no recorded patent or other activity in the office of 
the county recorder relative to the land in question, except the 
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mortgage in question, until 1966, when the patent and a warranty 
deed were recorded. 
POINT II 
THE SUBJECT MORTGAGE WAS NOT TIMELY FORECLOSED. 
While the Utah courts have apparently not ruled specifically 
on the question of the effect of the failure of the parties to 
include a provision in the mortgage relative to the time for 
repayment, the general rule, as stated ib 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 
364, is as follows: 
If a contract for the purchase! and sale of real 
estate provides for mortgages pr specified amounts, 
but is silent as to the date of maturity, it is 
then held that the law will imbly maturity 
on demand. (See Keystone Hard^ard Corp. v. 
Tague, 246 N.Y. 79, 158 N. E. 127, 53 ALR 610). 
(Emphasis Added). 
It has also been held that where the record fails to dis-
close when an indebtedness secured by a mortgage was due, it must 
be assumed that it was due at once or at least within a reason-
able time. (See Striker v. Rasch, 57 Wyb. 34, 112 P2d 570, 113 
P2d 963, 136 ALR 770). In a similar manner, this court has held: 
jsilent as to time, 
by compelling the 
"In view that the contract is 
the law supplies the ommissionl 
appellants to act within a reasonable time. What 
constitutes a reasonable time Would ordinarily be 
a question of fact under all of the circumstances." 
(Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 622). 
This court reiterated that principle in Christensen v 
Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P2d 101, 
the court stated: 
1959. In that case, 
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"No date was set for payment by the express 
terms of the contract and although in cases of 
this kind, the time of payment necessarily is implied 
and calls for performance within the reasonable 
time, under familiar equitable principles . . . " 
(Pg. 104) 
The court then cited the case of Frailey v. McGarry, 1949, 116 
Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840, which situation involved one party 
giving the other party reasonable notice of the recision of a 
contract because of fraud. The court held in that case, that a 
ten month delay after the default or misrepresentation was known, 
was not reasonable notice. 
The trial court was faced with the question of what is a 
reasonable time within which to foreclose a mortgage that con-
tains no due date and determined that an action commenced seven-
teen years after the giving of the mortgage which had no due 
date, and more than three (3) years after the youngest minor had 
reached her majority, was a reasonable length of time. Appellants 
believe that said decision was incorrect. By its very nature, 
the mortgage, if it was valid, is and was due upon demand and 
should have been paid within a reasonable time after being exe-
cuted. Appellants can see nothing reasonable about a mortgage 
which was executed in 1956, being foreclosed in an action which 
was commenced in 1973. Nevertheless, the question is, what is a 
reasonable length of time after December, 1956, within which the 
defendants should have foreclosed their mortgage? Surely, 
reasonable men should find that more than seventeen (17) years 
is a reasonable time within which to foreclose the subject 
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mortgage. Thus, the right to foreclose 
should be denied for failing to timely 
[the defendants' mortgage 
floreclose the same. 
POINT III 
THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE OR FORECLOSE TlHE MORTGAGE IN 
QUESTION WAS EXTINGUISHED OR BARREL BY THE RUNNING 
OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. 
It is undisputed that on March 19, (1958, Ezilda Hendricks 
was appointed as the guardian of each of her minor children, who 
appeared, defended and counterclaimed ad defendants herein. It 
is also an undisputed fact that Ezilda Hendricks was never re-
leased as the guardian of those children and continued, there-
fore, to serve as their guardian until such time as they reached 
their majority. The appointment of Ezilda Hendricks, who is both 
their mother and one of the mortgagors of the subject property, 
as the guardian of the defendants, had a legal effect that was 
apparently overlooked by the trial court, namely, that the 
Statute of Limitations commenced running against the minor child-
ren as to any rights to foreclose their(mortgage, by reason of 
the appointment of said guardian. 
In Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 U. 108, 66 P. 773, this court held: 
"The general rule is that when a trustee is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations] the cestqui que trust 
is likewise barred, even though an infant (Hill, 
Trustees, 267, 403, 504), andjthat the heir or 
devisee is dependent upon the diligence of the 
executor for the maintenance of his rights with 
respect to the real property but is not without 
remedy by an action for damages against his executor 
and his sureties or by a proper proceeding to compel 
him to bring suit ... Where the administrator in this 
state neglects to bring an action to recover property 
of the estate until it is barred under the Statute 
of Limitations applicable to jhe subject, tihe heir 
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is also barred even though the heir be a minor at 
the time the action accrues to the administrator," 
(At page 777). (Emphasis added) 
"The administrator or trustee having the right 
to commence suit for the recovery of the property 
within the time limited by the statute and having 
omitted to do so, he is barred from commencing such 
action against the respondents who are strangers 
to the estate and the beneficiary is also barred 
and his only remedy, if any, would be against the 
administrator and his sureties. " (At page 779) 
(Emphasis added). 
That rule of law was also followed by this court in the case 
of Dignan et al, v. Nelson et al. 26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936, at 
which time the court reiterated its decision in the Jenkins v. 
Jensen and concluded by saying: 
"Wei perceive no good reason to depart from the 
doctrine of that case and must, therefore, regard 
it as controlling authority on this point herein, 
not withstanding the argument of counsel for the 
appellants against its correctness. In this case 
the plaintiff, Emma McGuile, was not only the 
administrator of the testatefs estate, but was also 
the guardian of the minor heirs, and hence, she as 
their representative and trustee being barred as 
we have seen, such heirs are likewise barred." 
(Page 938) (Emphasis added) 
In 19 62, this court reiterated the doctrine of the Jenkins 
v. Jensen and the Dignan v. Nelson cases, when it held: 
"The guardian had possession or the right to the 
possession of their property for more than the required 
seven years. In Dignan v. nelson, this court held 
that where the Statutes of Limitations has run against 
a guardian, the minor heirs are likewise barred, 
just as we have held that when the administrator is 
barred, the minor heirs of the decedent were barred 
and for the same reason." (Page 463) (Parr v. Zions 
First National Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d 461) 
(Emphasis Added) 
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Thus the law of this state is clear 
Limitations is not tolled by the disabil 
that the Statute of 
lity of being a minor, 
when in fact those minors have a duly appointed guardian who is 
charged by the court to marshall and preserve all of the assets 
of said minors• If for no other reason than the existence of a 
validly appointed guardian, the defendantsf mortgage should 
not have been allowed to be foreclosed algainst the subject property 
If the guardian acted improperly, the redress of the defendants 
should be against the guardian and her bond or sureties, but 
should not be against the subject property. To allow such a 
foreclosure would be in derogation of ttje Statute of Limitations 
as the same have uniformly been applied 
other cases. 
by this court in all 
of us might be to not 
his or her parent, or a 
counter-defendant in 
While the natural tendency for all 
expect a child to pursue claims against 
parent to sue him or herself for misconduct, nevertheless, in 
this fact situation, it should be the c4se and the defendants 
had no trouble naming their mother as a 
their counterclaim herein. It should nbt be forgotten that it 
was Ezilda Reed Hendricks who voluntarily Solicited and accepted 
the responsibility to serve as the guardian of her children. Her 
appointment to so serve must be subject to all the legal rami--
fications that any other appointment would be subject to. Her 
failure to commence legal action against herself to foreclose the 
mortgage did not preclude those children from commencing an 
action against their mother for failing to marshall and preserve 
their assets as each reached their majority. The Statute of 
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Limitations did not commence to run against the individual minor 
as to their right to commence an action against their guardian, 
in this case their mother, until three years next after the 
termination of the guardianship. (See 78-12-18 Utah Code Annotated). 
Under the doctrine established in the Jenkins v. Jensen case, 
(supra) this court distinctly stated that the individual minor 
had the right to commence an action against his or her guardian 
in the event of the failure of that guardian to protect the 
rights of the minor during his or her incapacity. It is thus 
clear that the running of the Statute of Limitations against an 
individual minor, when the minor has a duly appointed and con-
stituted guardian to represent its interest, is not "tolled" in 
this state. 
If these minors had not in fact had a guardian, then we 
would be faced with an entirely different fact situation and the 
running of the Statute of Limitations would have been argued from 
an entirely different point of view. As mentioned above, any 
action by a minor, even against his guardian, for the recovery of 
any property that the guardian may have disposed of improperly, 
must be commenced within three years of the date of the termi-
nation of the guardianship. 
Title 75-13-14 of the Utah Code Annotated provides how the 
termination of guardianship is brought about. Provisions of that 
section are as follows: 
"The power of a guardian of a minor shall be 
terminated: First, by order of the court; 
Second, by the wards obtaining majority; Third, 
by the marriage of the ward; provided, that the 
guardianship of the estate of the ward may be 
continued at the discretion of the court after 
- l i -
the guardianship of his person! has been terminated 
by marriage, and until he reached the age of majority." 
(Emphasis added) 
Inasmuch as Ezilda Hendricks did not terminate the guardian-
ship by court action, it would thus seem that the second pro-
vision of Title 75-13-14 would apply, namely, that the guardian-
ship was terminated by the ward obtaining his or her majority. 
By stipulation it is agreed that the youngest of the Reed child-
ren reached their majority on June 15, 1970. Under the provisions 
of the code, a minor has three years after reaching his majority 
within which to commence an action to recover any estate sold 
by the guardian. If no action is commenced, then the minor is 
barred* 
The plaintiff commenced this action in February of 19 73. On 
February 26, 1973, the defendants1 attorney, Parker M. Nelson, 
answered plaintiff's complaint by denying the material allegations 
of the same and alleging simply that the mortgage was valid. 
There is nothing in the Statutes of the state of Utah nor in any 
of the decisions of this court that appellants have been able to 
find, which would construe that an answer of a defendant to be 
the same as the commencement of an action. In fact, Rule 3 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that an action may be 
commenced in one of two ways: 1. By-filing a complaint with the 
court; or 2. By the service of a summons. The defendants did 
neither of these. However, the filing tyf a compulsory counter-
claim could be construed to be a commencement of an action, 
especially in the light of this particular lawsuit. The defen-
dants were required to file their counterclaim or be forever 
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barred (See Rule 13 URCP). The defendants did not even attempt 
to file a counterclaim herein until on or about the 19th day of 
March, 1974, which was immediately prior to the first scheduled 
txial in this matter on March 27, 1974. Only after that date did 
the court grant the defendants leave to file their counterclaim. 
The youngest defendant reached her majority in June, 19 70, and thus 
the Statute of Limitations as to her claims expired no later than 
June, 1973. Thus, by March, 1974, the fact is that the claim 
upon which that counterclaim was based was then barred by the 
Statute of Limitations. The plaintiff-appellants did properly 
assert that defense in their answer to defendants1 counterclaim. 
The plaintiff-appellants thus conclude that in March, 1974, when 
the defendants filed their counterclaim, the defendants1 right to 
enforce or foreclose their mortgage was extinguished by the 
running of another provision of the Statute of Limitations. The 
lower court apparently discarded all claims by the plaintiff-
appellants to the use of the Statute of Limitations as a bar to 
the foreclosure of the subject property. This is difficult to 
understand. This court has specifically held that a junior 
mortgagee or grantee may invoke the protections of the Statute of 
Limitations relative to 78-12-23, which is the applicable section 
herein, when the Statute of Limitations has run against the prior 
grantee or mortgagee (See Krompton v. Jensen 78 U. 55, 65, 1 P.2d 
242; Boucofski v. Jacobson, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 and Graves v. 
Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 P. 674). In the Boucofski v. Jacobson 
(supra), this court held as follows: 
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"That the bar of the Statute mdy be invoked by the 
subsequent grantee or junior lien claimant in all cases 
when the bar could be invoked by the debtor unless the 
subsequent grantee has by agreement or otherwise 
estopped himself; that such grantee or claimant may 
also envoke the bar in case the senior claimant has 
had either actual or constructive notice of the sub-
sequent grant or lien while the right of action may 
still be alive as against the debtor, provided the 
full period of time required by the Statute has elapsed 
since the interest of the subsequent grantee or lien 
holder was acquired and the senior claimant has either 
actual or constructive notice of such interest for 
that period of time; that in case such interest be 
acquired before the original debt matured, the statute 
in favor of the junior claimant^ begins to run from 
the time the right of action against the original 
debtor accrued,(Page 122)(fimphasis added). 
". . . If the right of action 
against the debtor, the action 
within the six years from the 
was acquired if the prior c 
or within six years after such 
and if not so commenced, the s 
may invoke the bar of the Statute to the full extent 
of that interest; and,if he h^s acquired the equity 
mortgagor, or in 
the title, he may 
3-124) (Emphasis added) 
of redemption from the origina 
some other way has succeeded 
protect this title," (Pages 
tcb 
±1 
lias thus accrued 
must be commenced 
time such interest 
laiijiant had notice of it 
notice is acquired 
itibsequent claimant 
"Appellants therefore have the I full statutory period 
namely six years, from the time the cause of action 
accrued, within which to commence an action to fore-
close the mortgage, and if not within that time, the 
mortgage would have been the senior lien . . . by 
neglecting to institute suit, Appellants took the 
chances that the interest, although only a lien when 
acquired, may nevertheless ripen into a complete 
title and thus constitute a bar against them, not 
only so as to postpone their claim, but to prevent 
its enforcement against the prpperty at all." 
(Page 124) 
The Boucofski case dealt with a party having a tax title to 
the property in question, which tax title the court held became 
paramount and superior to a mortgage of record at the time the 
tax title was acquired. The law announced in the Boucofski case 
is still good law and it fits on all foujrs with the facts of this 
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case, namely, that the court found that those who acquired a 
subsequent interest or title to the land would be able to use the 
defense of the running of the Statute of Limitations to bar the 
enforcement and foreclosure of a mortgage existing when they 
secured their title to the same. 
In Graves v. Seifried, (supra) this court reached a decision 
similar to that in the Boucofski case when it quoted approvingly 
from a decision in California as follows: 
"'But it is a settled doctrine of this court, as 
will be seen from the authorities above cited, that 
when third persons have subsequently acquired interest 
in the property, they may invoke the aide of the 
statute as against the mortgagee even though the 
mortgagor, as between himself and the mortgagee, may 
have waived this protection; and we see no difference 
in the principal between a suspension of the running 
of the statute resulting from an express waiver, and 
one caused by his voluntary act in absenting himself 
from the state1. Under a review of the cases, the 
court further observes: 'The theory of all the 
cases above cited is, that while the general rule 
is that a plea of the statute of limitations is a 
personal privilege, the rule does not extend to 
subsequent property owners over which he has no con-
trol. ' Brandstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 229, 73 Pac. 
744." 
A similar result was reached in the case of Bracklein v. 
Realty Ins. Co., '95 U. 490, 80 P.2d 471, where the court held 
that even the purchaser of the mortgaged premises who assumed and 
agreed to pay the mortgage, could assert the running of the 
Statute of Limitations as a defense to a mortgage foreclosure. 
These decisions, while old, are still the case law in the state 
of Utah and no contrary decisions are to be found. 
The plaintiff-appellants urge that this court hold that the 
Statute of Limitations is a bar to the enforcement and fore-
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closure of defendants' mortgage against the subject property, 
thereby decreeing the same to be unenforceable, barred and 
extinguished. 
POINT IV 
THE INTEREST OF EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS*IN AND TO THE 
MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERED OR SEVERABLE. 
court correctly entered 
namely, Stuart Reed, 
At the time of the trial, the trial| 
the defaults of three of the defendants, 
Russell Reed and Donald Reed, each of whbm had failed to appear 
or answer plaintiff's complaint. The legal effect of said default 
would be to serve as a bar to any recovery by said defendants, 
or to extinguish their rights to the mortgage in question. A 
casual examination of the mortgage in question indicates that 
each of the defendants, both those appearing and those not 
appearing, had made separate contributions to the alleged mort-
gage. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
alleged mortgage could not have been foreclosed as to each of the 
defendants as each of them reached theirl 
since a specific amount is specified as 
then each of the defendants should have 
close the mortgage for that amount and for no more. As discussed 
above, the mortgage was due on demand. 
majority. In fact, 
[to each of the defendants, 
been entitled to fore-
Under the provisions of 
Titles 78-12-18 and 75-13-14, U.C.A., the interest of the indi-
vidual defendants, not only in this mortgage, but in any other 
matter, would have been subject to the Running of the Statute of 
Limitations as each of the defendants reached their majority. 
Surely, the separate contributions of each defendant to the 
- 16 -
mortgage principal was severable from the contributions of the 
other defendants. In Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117, 
this court held that in an adverse possession action, where there 
was no guardian for the minors involved, that the Statute of 
Limitations had run against those minors who had reached their 
majority, but had not run as to those who had not reached their 
majority. This court thus acknowledged the severability of the 
claims of minors, as they reach their majority. 
As the guardian of the estates of the defendants when they 
were minors, Ezilda Hendricks had no responsibility to marshall 
the assets of one minor for the benefit of another minor. Her 
only duty was to marshall the assets of each of the minor defen-
dants for their private and personal benefit. Each of the indi-
vidual defendants made a contribution to the consideration 
received for the mortgage and each of them at one time had a 
right to the recovery of that consideration. However, surely the 
older defendants are not to be allowed, by any stretch of the 
imagination or implication of law, to "toll" the running of the 
Statute of Limitations as.to them, until the youngest of their 
brothers and sisters became of age. Any disability that the law 
may have given the defendants as minors was removed by the 
appointment of a guardian for said defendants. Their guardian 
had the affirmative duty to foreclose said mortgage within six 
years after the mortgage was reasonably due. Since their guardian 
failed to foreclose said mortgage within the time allowed, the 
defendants are now barred under the ruling in Jenkins v. Jensen, 
Dignan v. Nelson and Parr v. Zions First National Bank (supra) 
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original mortgage, in 
from any right of foreclosure herein, whether severable or joint, 
Furthermore, the trial court, by granting the defendants a 
foreclosure of the entire amount of the 
effect set aside the default of the thre^ defendants who did not 
appear, nor file a counterclaim for foreclosure, because there 
was no way the sum due on the mortgage could be $15,750.00, 
without including the contributions of the three defaulted and 
non-counterclaiming defendants. The three defendants who did 
not appear, were "deemed, by law to have admitted plaintiff's 
complaint. Legally, therefore, the mortgage, with a specified 
amount of contribution from each of them, must have been satisfied 
as to the non-appearing defendants, suggesting again the sever-
ability of the mortgage as between each of the defendants. Had 
the mortgage in question only specified a lump sum due, without 
specifying the contributions of any of tne defendants, we might 
have a different conclusion to reach relative to severability of 
the mortgage and the amounts due thereunder the defendants. How-
ever, because: (1) There was a specified contribution as to 
each of the defendants; (2> This court held in Baker v. Goodman 
(supra) that the Statute of Limitations is not "tolled" for the 
older brothers and sisters until the youngest child reaches his 
or her majority; (3) More than a reasonable time (seventeen years) 
to foreclose the mortgage had run; (4) The defendants, while 
under the disability of being minors had a duly constituted 
and appointed guardian who was charged with marshalling all assets 
of the minors; and (5) The Statute of Limitations does run 
against minors who have a duly constituted and appointed guardian, 
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the plaintiff-appellants would urge but one conclusion, namely, 
that the mortgage was severable as between the individual defen-
dants, as well as being barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the plaintiff-appellants 
would urge this court to reverse the decision of the lower court 
granting the foreclosure of the defendants• mortgage against the 
subject property, the same being unenforceable and barred by the 
Statute of Limitations, or in the alternative, and in the event 
the foregoing should fail, to reverse the lower court, and to 
reduce the judgment of foreclosure by the amount contributed by 
the three defendants who were in default, together with any and 
all other defendants this court finds who were barred, by operation 
of law from enforcing their portion of the mortgage. 
tespecfc^lmfc submitted, 
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